We consider the problem of designing mechanisms that interact with strategic agents through strategic intermediaries (or mediators), and investigate the cost to society due to the mediators' strategic behavior. Selfish agents with private information are each associated with exactly one strategic mediator, and can interact with the mechanism exclusively through that mediator. Each mediator aims to optimize the combined utility of his agents, while the mechanism aims to optimize the combined utility of all agents. We focus on the problem of facility location on a metric induced by a publicly known tree. With non-strategic mediators, there is a dominant strategy mechanism that is optimal. We show that when both agents and mediators act strategically, there is no dominant strategy mechanism that achieves any approximation. We, thus, slightly relax the incentive constraints, and define the notion of a two-sided incentive compatible mechanism. We show that the 3-competitive deterministic mechanism suggested by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [12] and Dekel et al. [3] for lines extends naturally to trees, and is still 3-competitive as well as two-sided incentive compatible. This is essentially the best possible [3, 12] . We then show that by allowing randomization one can construct a 2-competitive randomized mechanism that is two-sided incentive compatible, and this is also essentially tight. This result also closes a gap left in the work of Procaccia and Tennenholtz [12] and Lu et al. [8] for the simpler problem of designing strategy-proof mechanisms for weighted agents with no mediators on a line, while extending to the more general model of trees. We also investigate a further generalization of the above setting where there are multiple levels of mediators.
INTRODUCTION
The Algorithmic Mechanism Design literature is generally interested in the implications of strategic behavior on the quality of social decision making. The usual assumption is that agents interact directly with a mechanism that picks an outcome. Yet, in many complex real world settings the interaction goes through intermediaries. If these intermediaries are acting strategically, this can influence the outcome picked by the mechanism, and result with an increase in social cost.
Consider, for example, a political decision taken by indirect voting. There are districts, and each district is represented by a representative. Each citizen has a position, and let us assume the positions of the citizens are points on an interval. A decision is also a point on the interval, and the cost for a citizen of such a point equals to the distance of her position from the decision made. Each representative aims to minimize the total cost for his own constituency, while the global goal is to minimize the total cost of all citizens. Decisions are taken using the reports of the representatives exclusively (there is no direct interaction with the agents), and these representatives have the freedom to manipulate their reports if such a manipulation helps their constituency. We are interested in questions such as: What is the cost for society of such strategic behavior? How should the society set up the decision process to minimize that cost?
More generally, we are interested in designing mechanisms that interact with strategic agents through strategic intermediaries (which we also call mediators). Agents have private information, and when put in a game, each agent acts to optimize her own utility. 1 The mechanism designer aims to optimize a social goal. The intermediaries do not have any private information of their own, rather, each intermediary acts in the mechanism on behalf of the agents associated with him, aiming to optimize the same social goal with respect to his agents only (note that he does not have a personal agenda and is completely benevolent). As the intermediaries control the information flow from the agents to the mechanism, the mechanism faces strategic behavior not only of the agents, but also of intermediaries: within the freedom given by the mechanism, an intermediary acts strategically to optimize on behalf of the agents he represents. 2 In this paper we aim to understand the implications of the strategic behavior of intermediaries on the welfare of the agents.
The general framework outlined above can be studied in the context of many specific settings, and might yield very different results in different cases. Here, we focus on one such example and leave the consideration of other settings for future works. The setting we consider is facility location on a metric induced by a publicly known tree, which generalizes the decision making problem on a line introduced above. There are n agents, each located at some private location. The agents are partitioned to k disjoint sets, and each set is represented by a unique mediator. The mechanism (or center) should locate one facility. The cost of an agent is her distance from the location of the facility, and she aims to minimize her cost. 3 The social goal considered is the goal of minimizing the total distance of the agents from the facility.
If the center had access to the locations of all agents he could minimize the total cost by locating the facility at a median of all locations. While all our results hold for general tree metrics, for the sake of the exposition, in the introduction we mainly discuss the euclidian metric on an interval of the real line. For that metric, if ti is the i-th left most agent (breaking ties arbitrarily) and n is odd, then there is a unique optimal location at the median location t (n+1)/2 (for even n there is an interval of optimal locations, between the two medians). With strategic agents but no mediators (or equivalently, with non-strategic mediators), there is a dominant strategy mechanism that is optimal: locate the facility at a median point, breaking ties to the left. While this result gives a complete picture for the standard model without strategic mediators, we show that with both strategic agents and strategic mediators the picture is much more complicated. We first show that there does not exist a dominant strategy mechanism achieving any approximation. This happens even in a simple setting with two possible locations, a single mediator and a single agent, as if the agent switches between the locations in her report, the mediator should switch them back, and vice versa.
Given the impossibility to achieve a dominant strategy mechanism with good performance, we suggest a slightly weaker solution concept for direct revelation mechanisms (in which each agent reports her location, and each mediator re-ports the locations of all his agents). Our aim would be to build mechanisms which achieve good approximation (minimize the ratio between the cost of the outcome and the optimal cost). A mechanism is agent-side incentive compatible (agent-side IC) if each agent has a dominant strategy to be truthful given that her mediator is truthful (regardless of any parameter of the model, like the number of mediators, and regardless of other players' strategies). A mechanism is mediator-side incentive compatible (mediator-side IC) if each mediator has a dominant strategy to be truthful given that all his agents are truthful (again, regardless of any parameter and regardless of other players' strategies). We aim to construct mechanisms that are two-sided incentive compatible (two-sided IC), i.e., they are both agent-side incentive compatible and mediator-side incentive compatible. We construct both deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and prove that they achieve essentially the best possible performance. 4 One of the settings considered by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [12] is equivalent to designing deterministic mediatorside IC mechanisms on an interval of the real line. Their work implies that the results of Dekel et al. [3] for regression learning induce a 3-competitive deterministic mediator-side IC mechanism on an interval, and that this is essentially the best possible competitive ratio for such a mechanism. The mechanism induced works as follows: for every mediator, it replaces all points reported by the mediator by the optimal 5 location for that mediator, and then finds an optimal location with this new input (the mechanism essentially computes median of medians, weighted by the number of agents each mediator represents).
We prove the above mechanism is also agent-side IC, and describe a simple extension of it to general trees. This yields the following theorem. Theorem 1. There exists a deterministic two-sided IC mechanism on tree metrics with a competitive ratio of 3. Moreover, for any fixed ε > 0, there is no deterministic twosided IC mechanism with a competitive ratio of 3 − ε.
Procaccia and Tennenholtz [12] asked whether it is possible to get a better competitive ratio using randomization. They were able to answer affirmatively in the case of two mediators representing a "similar" number of agents. Lu et al. [8] extend the analysis of the mechanism of [12] to the case of multiple mediators representing a "similar" number of agents. However, even if all mediators have equal number of agents, the competitive ratio of this mechanism approaches 3 as the number of mediators increase. On the negative side, [8] gives a hardness result of 1.33 using a complex LP-based proof.
We suggest a new and sophisticated randomized mechanism that is 2-competitive and works for any tree. We also prove using a simple argument that this is essentially the best possible. This result closes the gap left in the work of Procaccia and Tennenholtz [12] and Lu et al. [8] for the simpler problem of designing strategy-proof mechanisms for weighted agents with no mediators on a line, while extending to the more general model of trees.
For the case of locations on an interval of the real line the mechanism works as follows. For every mediator it replaces all points reported to the mediator by the optimal location for that mediator. For simplicity assume that the number of agents can be divided by 4. Then, it sorts the locations and uses a uniformly selected point among the n/2 central points (that is, the points from the n/4 + 1 leftmost location to the 3n/4 leftmost location).
The randomized mechanism for trees generalizes this idea but is much more involved, and is our main technical contribution. This mechanism chooses from the set of medians (optimal locations of mediators) a "core" subset. This core is the equivalent of the central points from the line case. Each point in the core is assigned some positive probability to become the facility location. However, unlike in the line case, the probabilities assigned to the points of the core are non-uniform, and are carefully chosen to achieve both the competitive ratio and the right incentives. The exact probability distribution depends on the medians of all mediators, including medians outside of the core. If all the reports happen to fall on a single line, then the probability distribution becomes uniform, and the algorithm reduces to the one described above for lines.
We remark that all our mechanisms run algorithms that use only the optimal location for each mediator, and do not need, in addition, access to the exact locations of the agents associated with each mediator. We call an algorithm that satisfies this property a mediator based algorithm. We prove that such algorithms, which use only the locations of the optimal points of the mediators (and not the locations of their agents), cannot be better than 2-competitive. Interestingly, we show that there exists a deterministic mediator based algorithm that has a competitive ratio of 2, yet that algorithm is not two-sided IC. Thus, for deterministic two-sided IC mechanisms, the implications of strategic behavior by the mediators goes beyond the constraint of being mediator based; such mechanisms cannot be better than 3-competitive (which is tight). Thus, there is a gap that is a result of incentives, and is not due to insufficient information.
Tree metrics are a strict generalization of line metrics and capture domains that cannot be reasonably modeled by line metrics. Consider the following toy example. People of three nationalities live in a single country (e.g., Switzerland), and want to elect a president. The candidates for the position differ in two attributes: their nationality and their degree of nationalism (for example, how much are they willing to settle for a compromise when dealing with an issue on which the different national groups disagree). Each citizen, naturally, wants to elect a president sharing his nationality, but different citizens of the same national group might want to elect candidates with different degrees of nationalism. Notice that a candidate of low nationalism is more acceptable by citizens of other nationalities (regardless of the level of nationalism, every citizen would probably like to have a president of her own nationality), thus, the metric induced by this example is a star with 3 edges (of course, one can think of a country with more nationalities to get a star with more edges).
We also consider a generalization of the above setting allowing multiple levels of mediation. In other words, the center, agents and mediators form a tree, in which the root is the center and the leaves are the agents. Every internal node of the tree is a mediator representing its children in the tree. Unfortunately, the competitive ratio of every mechanism for this setting degrades exponentially with the height of the tree, even when the mechanism is only required to respect a very weak definition of incentive compatibility. This result is consistent with the existence of a symmetric voting system composed of k levels where a minority of size exponentially small in k can control the decisions of the system. 7 Finally, we show that the mechanism that iteratively applies weighted median has a competitive ratio which is essentially optimal and satisfies the weak notion of incentive compatibility.
Related Work
In this paper we deal with mediators who act as intermediaries between a set of agents and a mechanism. The most related setting studied in the literature is the recent work on auctions with intermediaries [4] . There, as in our setting, both agents and intermediaries are strategic. However, the setting there is Bayesian while ours is Pre-Bayesian. Also, our aim is to address the social welfare issue requiring dominant strategies by the agents when their associated mediator is truthful, rather than revenue maximization.
More generally, our work refers to the study of mediators (see, e.g., [9] for a study in the context of complete information games, and [2] for a study in the context of incomplete information games). However, the typical signature of work on mediators is a single mediator that serves as an arbitration device: the agents are not a captive audience, and each of them can decide to participate in the game directly or work through the mediator. In our setting there are multiple intermediaries, each having his own captive audience, which must play the game through the intermediary. Moreover, the intermediaries are players and try to optimize their own utilities. Our setting nicely fit with situations such as voting by the (already selected) representatives of a geographic area or interest group. Additionally, we would like to mention the work of Leyton-Brown et al. [6] which deals with game theoretic aspects of bidding clubs in which "collusion devices" (cartels) are strategically created in a fixed mechanism (first price auction). In contrast, in our setting the partition of agents to mediators is pre-determined and our focus is on mechanism design given that fact.
The specific example of the framework that we consider is related to the recent literature on approximated mechanism design without money [12] . This literature deals with approximation algorithms which are used to resolve incentive issues for tractable problems rather than overcome computational complexity of intractable problems, when no money transfers are available. An additional conceptual contribution of our work is extending the literature on approximate mechanism design without money to incorporate mediation devices. Indeed, the problem studied in this paper, the facility location problem, is the canonical problem of that literature, which is easily solved (optimally) if no intermediaries are in place.
As pointed out previously, the design of mediator-side incentive compatible mechanisms is equivalent to the design of strategy-proof mechanisms for weighted agents that was studied by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [12] , and later also by Lu et al. [8] (these papers only considered the special case of a line metric). The implications of this equivalence to our settings were discussed above.
The literature on facility location on a line based on information provided by strategic agents is classic in the context of mechanism design with single-peaked preferences [10] . The extension of this problem to facility location on a network has been introduced by [13] . It has been shown that there exist non-dictatorial strategy proof algorithms for facility location on trees, and that any graph possessing circles does not allow for that. The study of approximate mechanism design without money for networks [1] discusses the minimization of the maximal distance to a facility on a network using deterministic and probabilistic strategy proof algorithms, yielding some positive approximation results and tight bounds. The problem of approximating the optimal location of two facilities on a line using strategy proof mechanisms has been discussed in [7] , while the general case of locating k facilities in an approximately optimal manner using strategy proof mechanisms can be handled for large populations by the general technique given in [11] .
MODEL AND SOLUTION CONCEPT
Within the general framework of strategic mediators we focus on one specific mechanism design problem: facility location on a metric induced by a publicly known tree T = (V, E) with the following metric on each edge. Each edge e ∈ E in the tree is mapped to the interval [0, ℓe] for some ℓe > 0, with the usual Euclidian metric. In our problem there are n agents, each of which has a private position which can be represented by a point on the tree. The position of an agent can be either a node v ∈ V or a point somewhere along an edge e ∈ E. Each one of the n agents is associated with one of k mediators. For i ∈ [k], mediator di represents a set Ai of ni agents; we denote these agents by ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,n i . As we assume each agent is associated with exactly one mediator, the sets of agents of any two mediators do not intersect and
The position of each agent is only known to the agent herself, and we denote the private position of agent ai,j by ti,j. Everything else is common knowledge. In particular, the number of agents represented by each mediator is known to the mechanism. 8 We call a point from the metric induced by T simply a "point".
For example, by saying that "p is a point" we mean that p is a point from the metric induced by T . Particularly, the location of each agent is a point.
The center has to pick a position for a single facility. If the center locates the facility at point p, then the cost of an agent ai,j is dist(p, ti,j), where dist(p, ti,j) is the distance between p and ti,j along the metric induced by T . The social cost of locating the facility at point p is
, the sum of all the agents' costs. The objective of the center is to pick a location for the facility that minimizes the social cost. The cost of a mediator di (i ∈ [k]) is the total cost for the agents he represents, which is
. Each mediator aims to minimize his cost. We use the term player to denote either an agent or a mediator. We assume that the center and players are risk neutral, and for a distribution over locations, they evaluate their cost by the expected cost. Note that in our model there is no money, and utilities cannot be transferred.
An algorithm for the center is a mapping from its input, the locations of all agents, to a location for the facility. We say that an algorithm is α-competitive, or has a competitive ratio of α, if for any set of locations for the agents, the location picked by the center for the facility induces a cost that is at most α times larger than the minimal possible cost (with respect to its input).
When the agents' locations are private information the center has to come up with a mechanism by which players report their information and this information is used to pick a facility location. We consider direct revelation mechanisms in which each agent is asked to report her location (to her mediator), and each mediator is asked to report the location of each of his agents. The mechanism uses the public information and the mediators' reports to locate the facility, with the aim of minimizing the social cost. We say that a mechanism is α-competitive, or has a competitive ratio of α, if under the solution concept that we consider, the location of the facility picked by the center has cost that is at most α times larger than the minimal possible cost. Crucial to our model is the assumption that the center (or the mechanism) can not interact directly with the agents, and has access to their locations only through their mediators, which can manipulate the agents' reports.
Solution Concept. Any direct revelation mechanism picked by the center puts the agents and the mediators (the players), which are both strategic, into a game. We would like to use mechanisms which induce games with some desired properties.
A direct revelation mechanism is dominant strategy truthful if it is a dominant strategy for each agent to report her location truthfully (regardless of the strategies chosen by the mediators and the other agents), and it is a dominant strategy for each mediator to report the locations of all of his agents to the center exactly as reported to him by the agents (again, regardless of the strategies chosen by the agents and the other mediators). We observe that asking a competitive mechanism to be dominant strategy truthful is unrealistic.
Observation 1. No direct revelation dominant strategy truthful mechanism has a finite competitiveness, and this is
to show that no constant competitive ratio is possible. The assumption that size of the population represented by each mediator is public is reasonable in many settings, for example, the size of the population of a congressman's district is publicly known.
true even if the center is allowed to charge the mediators and agents.
Proof. Consider an instance with a single mediator representing a single agent which can take two possible locations x and y. To have finite competitiveness the center must locate the facility at the location of the agent (when both the agent and the mediator are truthful). However, the center gets no information other than the report of the mediator, and therefore, it must always locate the facility at the location reported by the mediator. Moreover, the charges collected by the center can depend only on this location.
Let px and py be the charges that the mediator pays when reporting x and y, respectively. Assume without loss of generality that py ≥ px. Now, assume that the agent's strategy is to report y despite the fact that she is located at x. If the mediator switches the location back, then his cost is px, while a truthful repetition of the agent's report will result in a cost of py + |y − x| ≥ px + |y − x| > px. Thus, it is clearly non-optimal for the mediator in this case to truthfully repeat the report of the agent.
Remark 1.
The above impossibility applies to a setting in which all entities have exactly the same utility function, so there are no conflicts. It is a result of the sequential nature of information propagation from the agents to the center through the mediators, and the incompatibility of that with dominant strategies.
Given this impossibility result we need to settle for a slightly weaker solution concept, achieving Incentive Compatibility (IC) in the following sense. We still want each agent to have an incentive to be truthful, as long as her mediator is truthful (as opposed to playing an "unreasonable" strategy), and we want each mediator to be truthful as long as his agents are truthful. This is captured by the following definition.
Definition 1.
A direct revelation mechanism is agent-side incentive compatible if for every mediator di, in the induced game created by fixing di to be truthful, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for each agent ai,j represented by di.
A direct revelation mechanism is mediator-side incentive compatible if for every mediator di, in the induced game created by fixing all di's agents to be truthful, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for di.
A direct revelation mechanism is two-sided incentive compatible if it is agent-side incentive compatible and mediatorside incentive compatible.
Note that in any two-sided incentive compatible mechanism, it is in particular an Ex-post Nash for all players to be truthful.
To understand the implication of strategic behavior by the mediators we compare the competitiveness achieved by the best two-sided incentive compatible mechanisms to the competitiveness achieved by the best agent-side incentive compatible mechanisms (we do so both for deterministic and for randomized mechanisms).
Agent-Side Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
Median points play a significant role both in the optimal algorithm and our mechanisms. We next present some basic definitions and observe that median points exactly characterize optimal locations. Definition 2. Median points and weighted median points are defined as follows.
• A weighted point is a pair (p, x) where p is a point and x is a positive real number. Given a weighted point p = (p, x), we say that x is the weight ofp, and write w(p) = x. We also think ofp as located at location p in the metric. Hence, we can talk, e.g., about the distance between two weighted points.
9
• Given a multi-set S of elements, let f (p, S) be the multiplicity of p in S (i.e., f (p, S) is the number of copies of p in S). Given an additional multi-set S ′ , we denote by S ∪ S ′ and S \ S ′ two multi-set containing f (p, S) + f (p, S ′ ) and max{f (p, S) − f (p, S ′ ), 0} copies of every element p ∈ S ∪ S ′ , respectively.
• Given a multi-set S of weighted points and a point p.
-Let Sp denote the multi-set of weighted points in S that have p as their location. More formally, for every weighted pointq = (q, x) ∈ S, the multi-set Sp contains f (q, S) copies ofq if q = p, and no copy ofq otherwise. -The weight of S, denoted by w(S), is the total weight of the weighted points in S. More formally,
, -Let mp be the maximum weight of a multi-set S ′ ⊆ S \ Sp such that the path connecting every two weighted points of S ′ does not go through p.
• Given a multi-set S of points, we say that a point p is a median of S if it is a weighted median of the multiset S ′ containing f (p, S) copies of (p, 1) for every point p ∈ S.
Informally, a point p is a median of S if removing it splits the tree T into parts, each containing at most |S|/2 points of S. The importance of median points stems from the following easy observation, whose proof is deferred to a full version of this paper due to space constraints (simpler versions of this lemma go back to [5] 
The mechanism that always picks a median of all the locations of the agents (with a careful tie breaking) is optimal and agent-side incentive compatible. Thus, we have the following observation that naturally extends a well known result for line metrics [12] .
Observation 3. There exists a deterministic agent-side incentive compatible mechanism which is optimal (i.e., 1-competitive).
We note that the optimal agent-side IC mechanism is deterministic. Hence, randomization clearly does not help in improving performance when mediators are not strategic. Our results show that this is not the case when mediators are strategic and one aims for two-sided IC mechanisms.
Mediator Based Algorithms
We say that an algorithm for the center is mediator based if it uses only an optimal facility location for each mediator (but never uses any other information regarding the positions of the agents themselves). We show that for mediator based algorithms, randomization does not improve performance, as any such randomized α-competitive algorithm can be transformed to a mediator based deterministic algorithm with the same competitive ratio (moreover, the resulting algorithm performs at least as good on every single input). To state this result we first need the following lemma whose proof is deferred to a full version of this paper.
Lemma 1. For any tree and any distribution over points F , there exists a point p(F ) such that for any finite multi-set S of points:
E p ′ ∼F [ ∑ q∈S dist(p ′ , q) · f (q, S) ] ≥ ∑ q∈S dist(p(F ), q) · f (q, S) .
Moreover, for the euclidian metric on [a, b] (for arbitrary a and b) the expected location according to F can serve as such a point p(F ).
Note that p(F ) does not depend on S, and the same p(F ) works for every S. A randomized algorithm maps the locations of all agents to a distribution over locations F . By the above lemma the deterministic algorithm that instead locates the facility deterministically at p(F ) can only improve the social cost for every input. Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Given any α-competitive mediator based randomized algorithm, it is possible to construct a mediator based deterministic algorithm with the same competitive ratio α.
Note that the above transformation does not maintain incentives, indeed we show below that there exists a mediator based randomized two-sided IC mechanism which is 2-competitive, but no mediator based deterministic two-sided IC mechanism achieves this competitive ratio. Thus, although randomization does not improve performance for mediator-based algorithms, it does improve performance for mediator-based two-sided IC mechanisms.
DETERMINISTIC TWO-SIDED IC MECHANISMS
In this section we extend the deterministic "median of medians" mechanism of [3, 12] from lines to trees and show that the resulting mechanism, which we call the Weighted Median Mechanism (WMM), is a deterministic two-sided IC mechanism. This mechanism is also 3-competitive, which is essentially tight by a lower bound of [3, 12] (given for completeness as Theorem 4). The mechanism essentially elicits from each mediator an optimal location from the mediator's perspective (median of the mediator's agents), and then picks a weighted median of these locations. To create the right incentives for the agents and mediators, tie breaking must be handled carefully in both steps of the mechanism. By breaking ties in a way that is independent of the players' reports, we make sure the players have no incentive to manipulate. The basic idea is that in each step we break ties in favor of the point closest to an arbitrary predetermined point. To formally describe WMM we need the following observation which proves that the above tie breaking rule is well defined, i.e., whenever the mechanism has to decide between a set of points, there is always a unique point in the set which is closest to the arbitrary predetermined point. The proofs of Observation 4 and the other claims in this section are deferred to a full version of this paper due to space constraints.
Observation 4. Given a non-empty finite multi-set S of weighted points and an arbitrary point z ∈ V , the set M of weighted medians of S contains a unique point p closest to z.
The Weighted Median Mechanism (WMM) is a direct revelation mechanism in which the center does the following:
• For each mediator di it computes ℓi which is the median of the multi-set {t ′ i,j |1 ≤ j ≤ ni} closest to zi, where t ′ i,j is the location reported by di for agent ai,j and zi is an arbitrary point chosen independently of the reports received from the mediators (such a median exists, and is unique, by Observation 4).
• Let M be the set of weighted medians of the multiset {(ℓi, ni)|1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Locate the facility at the point of M closest to z, where z is an arbitrary point chosen independently of the reports received from the mediators. The next theorem summarizes the properties of WMM.
Theorem 3. For any tree metric, the Weighted Median Mechanism is a deterministic two-sided IC mechanism with a competitive ratio of 3.
Note that this direct revelation mechanism can also be executed with much less communication since the only information the center needs from each mediator is a single point (the location of the median closest to some arbitrary point), and not the location of every agent represented by the mediator. Thus, the center can ask each mediator di to report a single location ℓi, and locate the facility at the weighted median of the multi-set {(ℓi, ni)|1 ≤ i ≤ k} closest to some point z picked in advance. Observe that this algorithm for the center is mediator based. The resulting mechanism clearly achieves the same competitiveness as the direct revelation mechanism when each mediator di indeed reports a median location ℓi of his agents closets to an arbitrary point zi since the location is picked using exactly the same method. Moreover, this mechanisms is also two-sided IC since the space of possible deviations for the mediators in this mechanism is more restricted than the corresponding space in the direct revelation mechanism.
On line metrics WMM is essentially identical to a mechanism already known to be 3-competitive and mediator-side IC by an observation of [12] based on a result of [3] . The following theorem proved by [3, 12] shows that WMM has an optimal competitive ratio. 
RANDOMIZED TWO-SIDED IC MECH-ANISMS
It is known by [3, 12] that there is no deterministic TwoSided IC Mechanism that is better than 3-competitive (this result also appears as Theorem 4) . In this section we show that we can improve and achieve a competitive ratio of 2 by switching to randomized mechanisms, and that this is the best ratio that can be achieved. All the proofs in this section are deferred to a full version of this paper due to space constraints.
To simplify the exposition of our mechanism, we first describe it for the simple case of line metrics (i.e., for the case where the tree T is simply an interval). A line metric is the Euclidean metric of an arbitrary interval [a, b] (where a < b are real numbers). Notice that a point in the metric is simply a real number from the interval [a, b] . The Two Percentiles Range Mechanism (TPRM) is a direct revelation mechanism in which the center runs the following algorithm:
• For each mediator di compute the median ℓi of the multi-set {t ′ i,j |1 ≤ j ≤ ni} that is closest to zi, where t ′ i,j is the location reported by di for agent ai,j and zi is an arbitrary point chosen independently of the reports received from the agents.
• Consider the multi-set S of points, created by adding ℓi to the multi-set ni times, for each i. Let ui denote the i-th element of this multi-set when sorted in any non-decreasing order.
• Randomly choose a location for the facility from the list: u ⌊n/4⌋+1 , u ⌊n/4⌋+2 , . . . , u ⌈3n/4⌉ , where the probability of each value ui in this list is (n/2) −1 , except for the first and last values (u ⌊n/4⌋+1 and u ⌈3n/4⌉ ), which have a probability of (1 − r/4)/(n/2) where r is the reminder of dividing n by 4. Like in the deterministic case, Observation 4 ensures that ℓi is well defined for every i. Also similarly to the deterministic case, this direct revelation mechanism can also be executed with much less communication by only asking each mediator to report a single point (the location of the median closest to some arbitrary point) and running a mediator based algorithm that corresponds to the two final steps of TPRM on the reports. The resulting mechanism will have the same properties (competitiveness, incentives) as the direct revelation mechanism.
Theorem 5. For any line metric, the Two Percentiles Range Mechanism (TPRM) is a randomized two-sided IC mechanism with a competitive ratio of 2.
The intuition behind the improved competitive ratio of TPRM, as compared to WMM, is as follows. Consider a section s connecting the real locations of two agents separated by no other agent.
• If s is located near the median of all the agents, then it is not very important on which side of it is the facility located, because either way s will contribute to the distance between the facility and about half the agents.
• If s is located very far from the median, then both TPRM and WMM will locate the facility at the "right" side of s.
• If s is not located near the median, nor very far from it, then it is important that the mechanism will locate the facility at the right side of s. WMM makes the wrong call for some inputs, and, being deterministic, when it makes the wrong call it makes it with probability 1. On the other hand, it can be shown that the randomized TPRM always has a significant probability of making the right choice. Next, we present a mechanism that extends TPRM to general trees, called the Tree Randomized Mechanism (TRM). Like TPRM, TRM defines a distribution over the medians of the sets reported by the mediators, and then chooses the facility location randomly according to this distribution. The distribution is carefully picked to achieve the best possible competitive ratio of 2. More specifically, the mass of the distribution is placed on the "central parts" of the tree, which is analogous to behavior of TPRM. Formally, TRM is a direct revelation two-sided IC mechanism that is also 2-competitive. The description of TRM consists of two parts. The first part of TRM determines the medians of the sets reported by the mediators, and then splits the edges of T at these points, which allows us to assume that all medians are vertexes of T . Additionally, this part finds a point r which is considered to be the "center" of T . If necessary, an edge is split to make r a vertex of T , and then T is rooted at r. If p is an internal point of an edge e, then: 7.
TRM -
Split e at point p to two edges. 8. Root T at r.
Clearly we can assume after the first part of TRM that {r} ∪ {ℓi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} ⊆ V . Since T is now rooted, we can define additional notation that is used to describe the second part of TRM.
Definition 3.
• children(u) -The set of children nodes of u in the tree.
• subtree(u) -The set of nodes in the subtree of node u, including u itself. More formally, subtree
• treesize(u) -The number of agents represented by a mediator di for which ℓi ∈ subtree(u). More formally,
The second part of TRM defines the probability distribution used to select the facility location. Informally, this distribution has the following property: the probability that the facility location is in the subtree of a (non-root) vertex u is proportional to max{treesize(u) − n/4, 0}. An alternative view of this distribution is that the algorithm preprocess the agents by discarding some agents of peripheral vertexes, and "promoting" other agents of these vertexes to be associated with vertexes which are closer to the root. After this preprocessing, the algorithm selects a uniformly random remaining agent, and locates the facility at the location desired by the mediator associated with the selected agent. The preprocessing is done in a way that guarantees the following:
• If only a few agents originally belong to the subtree of a vertex u (i.e., treesize(u) ≤ n/4), then all these agents are either discarded or promoted to some ances- tor vertex of u, and thus, u never becomes the facility location.
• If many agents originally belong to the subtree of a vertex u, then the preprocessing reduces the number of agents associated with this subtree by n/4 (or n/2 if u is the root).
Let c(u) denote the value n/4 for every node u ∈ X − {r} and n/2 for u = r. 3. Pick every node u ∈ X as the facility location with probability:
For consistency, define p(u) = 0 for every point u / ∈ X. Note that this direct revelation mechanism can also be viewed (and executed) as a mediator based algorithm as the center only needs from each mediator di a location ℓi which is optimal from di's perspective.
Theorem 6. For any tree metric, the Tree Randomized Mechanism (TRM) is a randomized two-sided IC mechanism with a competitive ratio of 2.
Let us get a better understanding of TRM by considering an example input (given as Figure 1 ) and explaining the probability distribution induced by TRM. The figure depicts the top 7 nodes of an example tree T that can be outputted by the first part of TRM. The number inside each node represents the portion of the agents population represented by mediators whose (sole) median is this node. For example, the number 0.24 appears inside the root node R, hence, in our example, 0.24 · n agents are represented by mediators whose median is R. Some of the nodes in the figure have a triangle shape dangling from them. Each triangle represents the subtree of the node it is dangling from, and the number written inside it represents the portion of the agents represented by mediators whose (sole) median is inside the subtree (but is not the root of the subtree). For example, inside the rightmost triangle we have the label 0.25. Hence there are 0.25 · n agents represented by mediators whose median is inside the subtree of D, but is not D itself. Finally, outside of each node there is an additional number (in a box). This number represents the probability that TRM selects this node as the facility location.
Following is a short explanation of how (some of) the probabilities in Figure 1 were calculated. We say that a node (subtree) in Figure 1 has a weight of x if x agents are represented by mediators whose median is the node (a node in the subtree). Observe that TRM selects R to be the root node r since its left subtree has a weight of only 0.36 · n < n/2, and its right subtree has a weight of only 0.4 · n < n/2. Next, observe that no triangle in the figure represents a subtree with weight of more than 0.25, and therefore, no node in the subtrees represented by these rectangles has a positive probability to be the location of the facility. Consider now a few of the nodes of Figure 1 .
• The subtree rooted at A (which contains A alone) has a weight of only 0.1 · n ≤ 0.25 · n, and therefore, A / ∈ X and thus has 0 probability to be the facility location.
• The subtree rooted at B has a weight of 0.26 · n > 0.25·n, and no other node in this subtree has a positive probability to be the facility location. Therefore, B has a probability of 2(0.26 − c(B)) = 2(0.26 − 0.25) = 0.02 to be the facility location.
• The subtree rooted at E has a weight of 0.36 · n > 0.25·n. However, E has a single child B with a positive probability, and the subtree rooted at B has a weight of 0.26. Therefore, E has a probability of 2(0.36 − c(E) − (0.26 − c(B))) = 0.2 to be the facility location.
• The subtree rooted at R has a weight of 1·n. However, R has two children E and F , each associated with a positive probability by the algorithm, whose subtrees have weights of 0.36 and 0.4, respectively. Therefore, R has a probability of
48 to be the facility location. The following theorem shows that TRM and TPRM have optimal competitive ratios. 
MULTIPLE LEVELS OF MEDIATION
In this section we present results for the case of multiple levels of mediation. We can represent a hierarchy of mediators by a tree (note that this tree is not the same tree as the one defining the metric). The root of the tree represents the center, each internal node represents a mediator, and each leaf represents an agent. The tree is common knowledge. Let s be the depth of the tree, or the maximal number of edges between the root and a leaf. The case we have studied so far is thus represented by a tree with three levels (s = 2), the root represents the center, the internal level represents the mediators, and the leaves represents the agents.
As before, a player is either an agent or a mediator. For each player, another player is a direct kin if that other player is either a descendent in the tree, or an ancestor in the tree. Recall that a direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which each agent reports her location, and each mediator reports all of the locations of the agents below him. In such a mechanism, we say that a player is truthful if she is an agent and she reports her location truthfully, or he is a mediator and he reports all of the locations of the agents below him truthfully (as received from his direct descendants). While our results from the previous sections show the existence of competitive mechanisms that are two-sided incen-tive compatible for trees with a single layer of mediators, the next theorem proves that even for a much weaker solution concept, ex-post incentive compatibility, competitive mechanisms with multiple layers of mediators are impossible.
Definition 4.
A direct revelation mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible if for every player, being truthful always maximizes the player's utility, assuming that all other players are truthful.
We note that this solution concept is weaker than being two-sided IC (or the natural generalization of this notion to more levels) as it does not require any player to ever have a dominant strategy in an induced game with only part of the other players (his direct kins) being truthful. Unfortunately, it is impossible to construct competitive expost IC mechanisms for s > 2. Proof. Consider the following instance on the metric interval [0, 2] with s = 3.
• Level 3 contains the center.
• Level 2 contains a single mediator C, reporting to the center.
• Level 1 contains two mediators, which we will call A and B, both reporting to C. • Level 0 contains five agents:
-Agents a, b and c are represented by mediator A, and located in 0, 0 and 1, respectively. -Agents d and e are represented by mediator B, and are both located at 2. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists a finite competitive ratio mechanism which is ex-post IC for the above instance. Observe that if the center gets a report stating that all five agents are located at a point p, then the mechanism must locate the facility at p to have a bounded competitive ratio. Assuming all players are truthful, except maybe for C. Then the following observations hold:
• Let S be the multi-set of the positions of the agents as reported to C. Then, S represents the true locations of all the agents.
• The center observes the report of C. Let m be S's median. By Observation 2, m is the optimal facility location for C. If C deviates and reports that all agents are located at m, the center will have to locate the facility at m, due to the above discussion. Thus, for C to have no incentive to deviate, the center must always locate the facility at the median of the locations it gets.
Consider now the situation that all players are truthful, except maybe for A. Let us considers A's situation. A is reported, correctly, that his agents are located at 0, 0 and 1. Thus, the optimal facility location for A is 0. If A reports truthfully, the center will get the reports 0, 0, 1, 2 and 2, and, by the above discussion, will locate the facility at 1. On the other hand, if A deviates, and reports that all his agents are located at 0, the center will get the reports 0, 0, 0, 2 and 2, and will locate the facility at 0 (which is better from A's point of view). Thus, the mechanism considered is not expost IC.
It seems that in any mechanism that satisfies "minimal" incentive properties, the only "useful" part of the information reported by a player to its ancestor is the optimal location (from the perspective of that player) with respect to that player's input. That is, the mechanism's output cannot change if the locations reported by a player are all replaced by the optimal location of that player (with respect to that player's input). This observation naturally suggests the following mechanism which generalizes the Weighted Median Mechanism. The mechanism iteratively computes weighted medians (breaking ties in a report-independent way) for each mediator, bottom up, and outputs the final location. Consider the example presented in the proof of Theorem 8. The suggested mechanism would behave as if A reports that all his agents are located at 0, and C reports that all his agents are located at 0 (as this is the median of his input which is 0, 0, 0, 2, 2). The final outcome would be to locate the facility at 0. Notice that this outcome, while not optimal, is not too far from optimality.
This raises few questions which we address next. First, assuming that all players are truthful, what is the approximation that this mechanism achieves? Second, what kind of incentive property does this mechanism satisfy? And finally, for this incentive property, is there any other mechanism that is substantially better?
We begin by establishing some notation. Let di,j be the j th node of the i th level in the tree, where the level of the leaves is i = 0 (notice that ds,1 is the root). For every 0 ≤ i ≤ s, let mi denote the number of nodes appearing in level i of the tree. For every mediator di,j we denote by Ci,j the set of children of di,j in the tree and by Ai,j the set of leaves (agents) that descent from di,j. For consistency, if di,j is an agent, then Ci,j = ∅ and Ai,j = {di,j}. Finally, for every agent a, let ta denote the location of a.
We can now formally define the mechanism. We note that this is not a direct revelation mechanism, but rather, each player is asked to report a single location.
In the Iterative Weighted Median Mechanism (IWMM):
• An agent reports her location.
• A mediator reports the weighted median of the reports he gets. More formally, let ℓi,j be the report of player di,j and let zi,j be an arbitrary point selected independently of any reports. Then, ℓi,j is the weighted median of the multi-set {(ℓ i−1,j ′ , |A i−1,j ′ |) | d i−1,j ′ ∈ Ci,j} closest to zi,j.
• The center locates the facility at the point it would have reported according to the above rule, if it were a mediator. Notice that IWMM is well defined by Observation 4. The next proposition summarizes the competitiveness of IWMM when viewed as an algorithm (with respect to its input). All proofs in the remining of this section are deferred to a full version of this paper due to space constraints. By Theorem 8, the direct revelation implementation of IWMM is not ex-post IC. Yet, this mechanism satisfies the following, much weaker, incentive property. Informally, every mediator, assuming that all his ascendants follow the protocol, and that the input he received from each of his direct descendants represents the true location of all agents of that direct descendant, will optimize his perceived utility by following the protocol.
Definition 5.
A single-location mechanism is a non-direct revelation mechanism in which each player is reporting a single location to its direct ascendant.
A player of a single-location mechanism is straightforward if she is an agent and is truthful, or if he is a mediator and the location he reports is optimal with respect to his utility function assuming every agent represented by a direct descendant is located at the location reported by that direct descendent.
For a player in a single-location mechanism, we say that being straightforward is naively optimal, if being straightforward maximizes the above utility function under the assumption that his ascendants are straightforward.
A single-location mechanism is naively incentive compatible if for every player being straightforward is naively optimal.
We note that the term naive comes to emphasize that the players do not form Bayesian beliefs regarding the true locations of their agents and they do not try to optimize with respect to that belief, but rather (naively) assume that the reports they receive represent the true locations of the agents. Such a naive behavior is consistent with a mediator that never allows himself to harm his agents in the case when the reported locations are actually the true locations of his agents.
We prove that IWMM is naively incentive compatible. Combining this with Proposition 1 we derive the following theorem which summarizes the properties of IWMM.
Theorem 9. The Iterative Weighted Median Mechanism (IWMM) is a naively incentive compatible mechanism with a competitive ratio of 2
s − 1 for any tree metric.
Note that although our incentive property is extremely weak, the competitive ratio of IMWW degrades exponentially in s. Can such bad performance be avoided? We conclude this section with a lower bound showing that up to constant factors, it cannot.
Theorem 10. Fix any constant ε > 0 and tree depth s ≥ 3. Then, no mechanism (possibly randomized) that is naively incentive compatible has a competitive ratio of 2 s−2 − 1 − ε even for line metrics.
CONCLUSION
We studied the impact of strategic mediators on the competitive ratio of IC mechanisms in a facility location setting. Our results show that a single layer of mediation cause a moderate degradation in the competitive ratio, which becomes much worse as additional layers of mediation are introduced. We also showed that randomized mechanisms perform better than deterministic ones.
Strategic mediators appear in many real world scenarios, and we believe it is important to study the implications of their behaviour in various settings. For example, in display advertising, one common practice is for a mediator to buy advertisement space on a web page and split it between multiple advertisers he represents. Assume the mediator gets bids from potential advertisers, and based on these bids decides how to bid for the space (in the ad exchange auction). If he wins the space he also need to decide how to split the newly bought space among his advertisers. The mediator needs a strategy that will incentivize his advertisers to be truthful, which is not a trivial task even if the ad exchange uses a second price auction. Studying the effect on the social welfare and revenue of such mediators is an interesting open problem.
